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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OP 
body corporate 
vs. 
SALT LAKE 
UTAH, a ) 
; and politic, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, ) 
COUNTY, '•: ) 
Defendant- ) 
Respondent. 
Case No. 14190 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The parties will be referred to herein either by 
name or in their respective capacities in the Court below— 
University of Utah, plaintiff—Salt Lake County, defendant. 
Picker X-Ray, a New York corporation, another defendant, is 
not involved in this appeal. 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought action against defendant Salt Lake 
County to recover personal property taxes assessed by Salt 
Lake County upon equipment owned by defendant Picker X-Ray and 
leased to the University of Utah. Picker paid the taxes upon 
its equipment to Salt Lake County, and pursuant to the provi-
sions of its lease agreement with the University of Utah, 
sought reimbursement from the plaintiff, 
The plaintiff asserted that the property in question 
was exempt from taxation and that the assessment by Salt Lake 
County was, therefore, improper. 
Defendant Picker X-Ray counterclaimed against the 
plaintiff seeking reimbursement for the taxes paid to Salt 
Lake County. Defendant Picker X-Ray also filed a Cross-Claim 
against Salt Lake County, asserting that the property of Picker^ 
was exempt from taxation and sought a judgment for the amount 
of taxes paid and an order declaring the property subject to 
the lease agreement to be exempt from taxation. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. granted defendant 
Picker X-Rayfs Motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaim 
reasoning that Picker X-Ray was entitled to reimbursement from 
the plaintiff based upon the CourtTs interpretation of the 
contract entered into between the parties. Based upon the 
Court's ruling, defendant Salt Lake County filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment against the plaintiff University of Utah. The 
issue presented to the Court by Salt Lake County's motion was 
whether or not the fact that the University of Utah obligated 
itself to pay the taxes of another (Picker) extended the 
University's exemption to Picker. The Court's answer was no. 
Its reasoning was that the University had contractually agreed 
to pay the tax liability and other charges that might be 
incurred by Picker X-Ray. Therefore, the University of Utah's 
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liability was based upon the contractual obligation to pay 
such additional liabilities and the effect of the Court's 
ruling was that the tax liability was solely that of Picker 
X-Ray and granted Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL \ 
Defendant Salt Lake County seeks to have the ruling 
of the lower Court determining the liability for the tax to 
be that of Picker X-Ray affirmed, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff University of Utah is a body corporate 
and politic organized under the laws of the State of Utah. 
On October 28, 1970, the plaintiff entered into an equipment 
lease agreement with defendant Picker X-Ray. (Plaintiff1s 
Complaint, Exhibit A) Said equipment lease was for' a primary 
lease term of 5 years and provided for the rental to be paid 
on a monthly basis for a period of 60 months. Under the 
terms of said lease, title would remain "at all times" in 
the lessor. At the end of the lease term, lessee (University 
of Utah) was to return the equipment in the same condition as 
received, reasonable wear and tear excepted. (Exhibit A, 
paragraph 2) Paragraph 5 of said equipment lease agreement 
provided that the lessee, University of Utah, would pay all 
taxes, assessments and other government charges levied or 
assessed upon the equipment and, further, the lessee agreed 
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to pay or reimburse lessor for all taxes, assessments and 
other governmental charges levied or assessed against the 
equipment and paid by lessor on account of its ownership 
of the equipment or any part thereof. 
Under paragraph 3 of said equipment lease agreement, 
lessor was to procure, without charge to lessee, insurance 
against loss, damage or destruction of the equipment by 
burglary, fire, lightning, wind or hail occurring prior to 
the due date of the final date of payment. If the equipment 
was totally or substantially destroyed, lessor had the option 
of terminating the lease or replacing the equipment. 
On December 17, 1970 and October 19, 1971, addenda 
to the equipment lease agreement of October 28, 1970 were made 
between plaintiff and defendant Picker X-Ray. (Plaintiff's 
Complaint, Exhibits B and C) 
Under the provisions of Exhibit B, plaintiff was 
given the option at the end of the lease to purchase the equip-
ment. Again, under Exhibit C, plaintiff could, at the end 
of the lease, purchase the equipment. The assessments 
complained of by the plaintiff were made for the years 1972, 
1973 and 197^ A H of these assessments were assessments prior 
to the end of the lease. All assessments were made prior to 
the time the plaintiff had the right to become a purchaser 
rather than a lessee. (T-2) There is no evidence in the record 
either by pleading or exhibit that would indicate the use made 
of the equipment. 
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Salt Lake County assessed Picker X-Ray for the 
personal property taxes on the equipment for the years 1972, 
1973 and 1974. (T-7) The assessments for 1972 and subsequent 
years were, pursuant to the lease agreement, billed to the 
plaintiff. (T-8) 
The plaintiff University of Utah advised the defendant 
Picker X-Ray that plaintiff was tax exempt. (T-30, 31, 32) * 
Defendant Picker X-Ray paid the taxes assessed by 
Salt Lake County and billed the same to the plaintiff. (T-8) 
Plaintiff filed its Complaint naming Salt Lake County 
and Picker X-Ray as defendants. By its Complaint, plaintiff 
sought a declaration determining the leased property to be 
exempt and sought repayment of the monies paid by Picker X-Ray 
to Salt Lake County. Plaintiff further asserted as against 
Picker X-Ray that plaintiff was not responsible for the taxes 
paid by Picker X-Ray. (T-l, 2, 3 and 4) 
Defendant Picker X-Ray filed an Answer, Counterclaim 
and Cross-Claim. (T-5) In its Counterclaim, Picker X-Ray 
asserted that the property taxes assessed by Salt Lake County 
were paid by Picker X-Ray and that the plaintiff had failed 
and refused to reimburse Picker as required by the agreement. 
(T-8) Picker X-Ray sought judgment against the plaintiff 
determining that plaintiff was responsible to defendant for 
th? amount oi." taxes paid by Picker to Salt Lake County, and 
further, ;na:, defendant be granted judgment against the 
plaintiff for the taxes paid. (T-9) 
Defendant Salt Lake County in its responsive pleadings 
asserted that the property was not exempt from taxation, that 
it was owned by Picker X-Ray, and that plaintiff was without 
standing to assert a claim, for reimbursement. (T-13,' 14, 15 
and 16) Thereafter, defendant Picker was granted a Summary 
Judgment upon its Counterclaim and against the University of -
Utah. (T-51 and 52) The effect of the Summary Judgment 
in favor of Picker X-Ray was that the taxes assessed by Salt 
Lake County and paid by Picker X-Ray xvere the contractual 
obligation of plaintiff. 
Thereafter, defendant Salt Lake County moved for 
Summary Judgment. At the hearing on Salt Lake County's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff attempted to introduce 
the affidavit of Raymond C. Bowden. (T-46-48) The affidavit 
was objected to on the grounds that it was not timely filed 
and that plaintiff's attorney did not even present it to 
defendant's attorney until after defendant's arguments to the 
Court, thereby depriving defendant's attorney of the opportunity 
to review, consider the same, or consider the filing of an 
appropriate opposing affidavit. The Court, therefore, sustained 
counsel's objection to the affidavit and ordered the same to 
be filed with the file, but on entry showing that the same was 
not considered. Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was granted. (T-49, 50) The judgment was 
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based upon the Court's previous ruling that the obligation of the 
University of Utah for the assessments made by Salt Lake County 
against Picker X-Ray was purely a matter of contractual liability 
(T-49 and 50) The contractual liability of the University of 
Utah arises from paragraph 5 of the equipment lease agreement 
wherein the parties to the lease agreed that the University as 
lessee would pay or reimburse Picker, as lessor, for all taxes 
and assessments levied or assessed against the eouipment and 
paid by lessor (Picker) on account of its ownership of the 
equipment or any part thereof. 
The plaintiff appealed only the Summary Judgment 
granted to defendant Salt Lake County. (T-53) Therefore, the 
CourtTs interpretation that the plaintiff's liability arises 
out of Picker's rights to reimbursement for assessments and levie 
on account of Picker's ownership of the equipment is final and 
conclusive. It is res judicata.
 : . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE EQUIPMENT LEASE 
AGREEMENT AND ADDENDA WAS NOT THE PROPERTY OP THE UNIVERSITY 
OP UTAH AND WAS, THEREFORE, PROPERLY TAXABLE TO PICKER X-RAY 
BY SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
Defendant Salt Lake County does not dispute plaintiff's 
assertion that the property of the University of Utah is exempt 
from taxation. Therefore, there is no argument made by defendant 
on this point. However, plaintiff's assertion that Section 
59-2-30 applies to create an exemption upon the property of a 
business corporation (Picker X-Ray) that is in the business of 
leasing equipment, merely because it happens to lease to the 
University of Utah, is competely without merit. There is no 
evidence in the record to show that Picker X-Ray meets the 
qualifications of Section 59-2-30, Utah*Code Annotated, 1953. 
There is no evidence in the record to show that the assessment 
made against Picker X-Ray was improper or illegal. In fact, the 
summary judgment granted to Picker X-Ray on its Counterclaim 
against the University of Utah which was not appealed establishes 
that: 
(1) Picker X-Ray was the owner of the property; 
(2) the taxes assessed against Picker X-Ray upon its 
equipment were lawfully assessed, and 
(3) that the plaintiff was obligated under the 
terms of the equipment lease agreement to reimburse the 
defendant Picker X-Ray. 
Since the Courtfs determination that the taxes were properly 
assessed against Picker X-Ray has not been questioned or 
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appealed by plaintiff, plaintiff cannot now assert that the 
assessment was in effect against the University of Utah. 
And, since there is no evidence to show that Picker X-Ray 
is a religious or charitable institution, Section 59-2-30, 
Utah Code Annotated, is not applicable. 
Under the provisions of the lease agreement, plaintiff 
University of Utah had the option, after the expiration of 60 
months of rental, to either continue to lease the property or, 
if it so determined, to purchase the equipment. No such right 
of purchase existed during the period of time covered by the 
assessments herein. In Hoover Equipment Company v. Board of 
Tax Roll Corrections of Adair County, Okla., 4.36 P2d 645'(1967), 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in an almost identical fact 
situation as herein presented determined that property leased 
subject to an option to buy was not "owned" by the exempt entity 
so as to exempt the property from ad valorem property taxes until 
the entity became legally obligated to pay the purchase price. 
In that case, the petitioner Hoover Equipment Company had leased 
certain road building and maintenance equipment to various 
counties. The assessments were made against Hoover as the owner 
of the property, Hoover asserted that it had sold the equipment 
to the various counties involved and that the property was, 
therefore, exempt. The Oklahoma Constitution contains wording 
similar to the Utah Constitution. That provision provided: 
"...all property of the United States, and of 
this State, and of the counties and of the 
municipalities of the State... shall be exempt 
from taxation...." 
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Article X, Section 6, Constitution, State of 
Oklahoma. 
In framing the issue presented to it, that Court stated 
"We are concerned with whether the adoption of...all property 
of the. .. counties ...,t! "means that such property must be owned 
by the county. We hold it does. (emphasis supplied) The Court, 
in examining the lease arrangement, observed that the county 
did not become legally obligated to purchase the equipment or 
to pay the purchase price therefor, but only agreed to rent 
or lease the equipment which lease had to be renewed and could 
be terminated at the county's option on any anniversary date of 
said lease. "The absence of an obligation on the part of the 
county prevents the passing to it of an interest in property 
sufficient for tax purposes." 436 P2d 645 at page 649 
In the instant case, the University of Utah had a 
lease for 60 months. Legal title remained in the lessor at 
all times. After 5 years, the University was to return the 
equipment in the same condition as received, reasonable wear 
and tear excepted. At the end of the 5 years, the lessee could 
purchase the equipment. The University could also decide not 
to purchase the equipment. It was not legally obligated to do 
so. It could also continue to lease the equipment after the 
5 years. However, its only fixed obligation was to pay rent 
for the 5 years. Since there was no binding obligation on the 
part of the University to purchase the property, the University 
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had no interest in the property sufficient to tax. Additional 
provisions of the equipment lease agreement support this asserti< 
Paragraph 9 of the lease provides that "Plates, labels or other 
markings may be affixed to the equipment Indicating that lessor 
is the owner thereof and lessee shall not remove such plates or 
identification during the term of this lease." (emphasis 
supplied) Further, paragraph 11 of the equipment lease contains 
a prohibition against sublease without prior written consent of 
the lessor. The parties to the lease in clear, concise and 
unequivocal language recognized and agreed that defendant Picker 
X-Ray was the owner of the property. It had all the rights of 
ownership subject to the provisions of the lease. The taxable 
interest was, therefore, in Picker and the Salt Lake County 
Assessor was required by law to assess taxes against Picker. 
See Sections 59-5-4 and 59-5-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. This determination was affirmed by the trial court 
when it ruled that the taxes levied against Picker as the owner 
of the property, pursuant to the lease agreement, were the 
contractual obligation of the plaintiff. That determination has 
not been appealed by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, binding 
upon both parties to this appeal. 
Plaintiff argues that the Court should liberally 
construe the law of this case and cites several cases in support 
of this request. Defendant would assert that any construction, 
liberal or strict, would support the decision of the trial court 
iln the instant case. The cases cited by plaintiff are inapplica 
-11-
to the Instant case, support defendants position, and are 
distinguishable. 
The case of City of Cheyenne v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 484 P2d 706 (1971) involved the question of whether 
or not the county could tax the city on buildings owned by the 
city and leased to various businesses at the airport. Under 
Wyoming law, the cityTs tax exemption was limited to property 
"owned and used primarily for a governmental purpose." Article 
15 Section 2, Constitution of Wyoming. The court upheld the 
exemption for the City of Cheyenne by determining that the use 
of the buildings by the city was within the exemption provisions 
of the Wyoming Constitution. In that case, the city was the 
fee simple owner of the property. Here, Picker X-Ray, by agreement 
of the parties and by a final determination by the trial court, 
was and is the owner of the property. Additionally, the property 
of the University of Utah is exempt by virtue of ownership, not 
because of use as was the case in Wyoming. See Article XIII 
Section 2, Constitution of Utah. Also, Sections 59-2-1 and 
53-48-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
In Mitchell Aero, Inc. vs. Milwaukee, 42 Wisconsin 
2d 656, 168 Northwest 2d 183 (1969), the plaintiff constructed 
two aircraft hangers as Its expense for land leased from the city. 
The lease provided that upon completion title to the hangers 
would immediately vest in the county which was exempt from taxa-
tion. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld taxes levied by the 
city against Aerofs beneficial ownership. The court used the 
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bundle of sticks argument as presented in plaintiff1s brief. 
In doing so, the court went beyond an analysis of where legal 
title was vested solely for the purpose of imposing taxes upon 
a private profit-making corporation attempting to hide behind 
the cityTs tax exempt status. The case, therefore, can be 
cited as supportive of defendant's position and to illustrate 
the lengths courts will go to in order to prevent private 
companies from obtaining exemptions pursuant to lease provisions 
with tax exempt organizations. In this case, plaintiff would 
seek to extend its exempt status as a University to Picker, a 
position contrary to the reasoning of the case cited by plaintif. 
Broadway and Fourth Avenue Realty Company v. Louisville, 30 3 Ken' 
202 197 S.W. 2nd 238 (1946) cited by plaintiff is similar to the 
Aero case in that the Supreme Court of Kentucky looked at the 
beneficial ownership for purposes of Imposing tax liability on 
a private, profit-making real estate company that leased propert; 
from a church for 99 years. Again, a private, profit-making 
entity was seeking to enjoy the benefits of a tax exempt 
organization. Again, the court denied the exemption. In so 
doing, the Kentucky court made the following observation: 
"It is a rightful thing to exempt 
religious, educational and charitable 
organizations from the necessity of 
paying taxes on their very own property. 
But a rather strict interpretation of what 
they own seems justified." 
It is also right that the University of Utah, as an 
educational institution and state agency, be exempt upon its 
very own property. But as in the Broadway case cited by plainti: 
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a strict interpretation of what the University owns is justified. 
Here they own nothing. As stated in the lease and as conclusively 
determined by the trial court, Picker X-Ray is the owner, and 
as the owner, is subject to taxation by Salt Lake County. For 
this Court to hold otherwise, would bring into question millions 
of dollars in personal property that is presently assessed 
throughout the State. For example, in today's computer age, 
governmental entities have become more reliant than ever upon 
the use of computerized equipment. Because of the rapid 
progress and increased technology being made in the field, these 
computers are constantly being changed and updated. The cost of 
purchase is, therefore, impractical as well as prohibitive. The 
equipment is, therefore, leased from such large companies as 
IBM and Univac. To rule in favor of plaintiff in the instant 
case, would mean that the computers and equipment owned by these 
and similar companies and leased for a profit tq the State, 
the Federal Government, cities, counties, hospitals and other 
governmental or exempt organizations, should also be exempt. The 
loss in revenue to the various taxing entities would involve 
millions of dollars. It would also discriminate between those 
leasing companies leasing to private enterprise and those leasing 
to exempt organizations. Both are in the same business—leasing 
for a profit. Why should one be treated more favorably than 
the other. Why should one have the competitive edge merely 
because it happens to lease some of its inventory to the University 
of Utah. 
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It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
property subject to the equipment lease agreement was the proper 
of Picker X-Ray. That the assessment was valid in all respects 
and that the ruling of the trial court in upholding the assessme: 
should, therefore, be affirmed. 
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POINT II. THE CONTRACTUAL ASSUMPTION OP PICKER X-RAY'S 
TAX LIABILITY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH DOES NOT RESULT IN 
THE IMPOSITION OF A TAX BY SALT LAKE COUNTY UPON THE UNIVERSITY 
OF UTAH. 
Appellant has Incorrectly perceived the assessment 
against Picker X-Ray to be a tax imposed by Salt Lake County 
upon the University of Utah and asserts in his brief that the 
clear and unequivocal legislative intent is to prohibit the 
taxing of one governmental "entity by another and thereby 
eliminate confusion and inequities. This case does not involve 
a tax upon the University of Utah. It involves a tax upon 
Picker X-Ray which tax the University has contractually agreed 
to pay. In City of Tempe v. Del Webb Corporation, 13 Ariz. 597, 
480 P2d 18, (1971)3 the appellee, Del Webb Corporation, had 
entered into contracts with the Arizona^Board of Regents for the 
construction of certain buildings upon the campus of Arizona 
State University in Tempe, Arizona. The City of Tempe assessed 
Webb for a privilege tax on payments made by the Board of Regents. 
The taxes were paid by Webb under protest and an action for 
recovery was instituted. The case was presented to the Court 
on stipulated facts. The trial court found in favor of Webb 
and determined that the imposition of the tax on Webb x^ ould have 
the practical effect of placing a tax on the State of Arizona, 
acting through its Board of Regents. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the State of Arizona reversed the trial court and 
in so doing made the following pertinent observations: 
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"We agree that the Board of Regents Is a 
state agency and therefore exempt from 
taxation. City of Tempe v. Arizona Board 
of Regents
 3 11 Ariz, App, 245 461 P2d 50 3 (1969)-
Here, however, we find neither interference with 
the functions of a state agency nor imposition of 
a tax on it. The test which is applied is ascer-
taining whether a tax offends Is the 'legal 
Incidence''"' test. " (emphasis supplied) 
"480 P2d 18 at page 20 
The Court went on further to say: "Nor does the 
State's express assumption of a contract obligation to pay the 
taxes against Webb operate to create an immunity.TT 
In Thiokol Chemical Corporation v, Peterson, 15 Utah 
2d 355, 393 P2d 391 (1964), this Court had occasion to apply 
the "legal incidence test". One of the questions presented 
was whether or not the imposition of a privilege tax upon 
Thiokol Chemical Corporation, which by contract was subject to 
reimbursement by the United States, imposed a tax upon the 
United States. In applying the test, this Court reasoned as 
follows: 
"It is stated that if the tax is 
directly upon the United States 
or an agency thereof, it is invalid. 
But the converse is also true: If the tax 
falls upon another, the fact that the tax 
might indirectly fall upon the United 
States does not render it invalid. It 
could hardly be otherwise. The U.S. 
Government must obtain many goods and services 
from private citizens., With respect to many, 
perhaps all, the chaise made to the Govern-
ment necessarily includes the supplier's 
cost of doing business, including his taxes. 
The fact that the Government, in paying 
the price charged for the goods or services, 
thus ultimately bears the burden of the 
supplier's taxes, does not mean that the 
tax is upon the Government within the 
sense proscribed by the doctrine of 
M'Culloch v. Maryland." 
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The reasoning of this Court in Thiokol is directly 
applicable to the instant case. The legal incidence of the 
tax imposed by Salt Lake County is upon Picker X-Ray> not the 
University of Utah. The fact that the University contractually 
assumed to pay Picker's property tax should not operate to 
create an immunity. 
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POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY NOT 
APPORTIONING THE TAX LEVIED UPON PICKER'S PROPERTY LEASED TO 
THE UNIVERSITY OP UTAH. 
Plaintiff's assertion that the District Court 
committed an error by not apportioning the tax is completely 
without merit. There Is nothing In the entire record before 
this Court to indicate that apportionment was sought. There 
is no allegation in plaintiff's Complaint. The Counterclaim . 
and Cross-Claim of defendant Picker X-Ray contains no language 
in that regard. Nor did plaintiff argue for apportionment 
at either of the hearings on motions for summary judgment. The 
first time such a request appears Is in plaintiff's brief. 
Even if the Court were to consider the question of apportionment 
there is no constitutional or statutory authority to .justify 
apportionment. 
The reasoning contained in Points I and II of defendanl 
brief are equally applicable to plaintiff's argument for apportic 
ment. 
Finally., plaintiff's assertion that Picker X-Rav merelj 
held a security interest in the equipment is not supported by 
the language of the equipment lease agreement, the pleadings and 
most conclusively the determination of the trial court when it 
rendered judgment on Picker's Counterclaim which is not before 
this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. in the Court 
below, correctly decided that the property was owned by Picker 
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X-Ray. That Salt Lake County properly assessed the same to 
Picker X-Ray and that as a result of such assessment^ the 
University of Utah became contractually obligated to reimburse 
Picker X-Ray for taxes paid to defendant Salt Lake County. 
Further, that the assumption of such contractual obligation by 
the University of Utah did riot effect a transfer of the 
University's exemption to Picker X-Ray. The judgment of the 
District Court should, therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM -
Salt Lake County Attorney, 
BILL THOMAS PfiTERS 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
Suite 400, Chancellor. Building 
220 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent, Salt Lake County 
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